摘要：中小股东作为投资者的重要组成部分，其权益的保障与一国证券市场及经济的繁荣发展息息相关。因而，中小股东权益的保护在国际范围内都得到高度的关注。我国作为一个发展中国家，证券市场的法律法规及公司治理的结构发展还不成熟，在中小股东权益的保护上更是存在许多地方急需改进。本文首先对中小股东保护领域的已有研究进行综述，基于代理理论，对公司经理人和控股股东对中小股东利益侵占问题进行分析。建立起代理问题、公司治理与中小股东利益关联性的理论架构，在总结、评价前人既有研究成果的基础上，发展出本文基于代理问题和公司治理对上市公司中小股东利益影响的研究方法。通过研究国际已有经验及我国的公司治理发展现状，利用实证模型分析国际经验对我国中小股东保护的有效性。结合中国资本市场具体背景，提出若干建议。
关键词：上市公司 中小股东 代理理论 公司治理
Abstract：The paper research based on the agency theory gives a direct view into the problems between three groups of stakeholder: small and medium sized shareholders, managers and controlling shareholders of the public listed companies. The paper gives a brief conclusion on previous researches and theories on the topic of the protection of small and medium sized shareholders’ interests. By reviewing the agency problems, corporate governance and relative literatures, the paper theoretically establishes a structure which contains agency problems, corporate governance which are made to protect the medium and small sized shareholders’ interests. After the conclusion and the evaluation of previous works, the research method is developed to find out ways that can work on the agency problems and ensure the profits of listed companies’ minority shareholders. The paper goes through the most popular ownership structures and corporate governance relationships to offer some suitable suggestions especially designed for the developing Chinese capital market.
Keywords: Public Listed Company; Agency theory; Corporate Governance Small and Medium Sized Shareholders;
